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ABSTRACT
Topic. The article reviews the legal possibility of full or partial EMU breakup (EURO-crack). The authors conducted 
jurisprudential researches of the European experience and compare both the provisions of the EU and Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU) documents (Treaty, Protocol 15) and integration processes maturity of the latter.
Purpose. The purpose of the article is to consider possible mechanisms and consequences of European Union (EU) 
member states exit from the economic and monetary union (EMU); to assess the applicability of the European 
experience to the development of monetary and economic integration among member states of Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU).
Methodology. The authors of the article use scenario analysis method to assess legal grounds, procedures, 
mechanisms and consequences of EU member states exit from the economic and monetary union for the ongoing 
one (Brexit) and the most probable options.
Results. The authors systematize and conduct consistent analysis of prerequisites, the chronology of formation 
of various European integration associations, fundamental legal documents and key milestones in the formation 
of monetary integration in the EU, the stages of European EMU development in its contemporary form. They 
include an exit from Eurozone: with further immediate application for repeat accession without taking part in the 
monetary union; retaining the EU membership based on the provisions of Vienna Convention regarding the law of 
treaties and that arising out of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU.
Conclusions. The authors conclude that the modern system of international law provides an effective denouncement 
mechanism of the Treaty on European Union and its individual provisions. They argue the possibility of changing 
the legal status of member States with varying degrees of participation in EMU and, on the example of Italy, 
criticized the initiative for a unilateral exit of a member state of the EMU.
Jurisprudential researches of the European experience conducted by the authors, allowed them to compare the 
provisions of the documents of the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) (Treaty, Protocol 15)), and the 
degree of maturity of the integration processes of the latter. Conclusions made by the authors about the prospects 
of economic and monetary integration of member States of the EAEU are the base of recommendations for action 
concerning deepening economic integration and creation of common financial market of the EEU. Conclusions 
made by the authors are also relevant to state authorities of the Russian Federation, including economic authorities 
and organs of diplomacy.
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Предмет. В статье исследуются правовые возможности полного или частичного выхода из Экономического 
и валютного союза (ЭВС) стран ЕС. С этой целью авторы провели правоведческие исследования опыта евро-
пейских страх и сравнили положения основных документов ЕС и Евразийского экономического союза (ЕАЭС) 
(Трактат, Протокол № 15), а также зрелость интеграционных процессов в ЕАЭС.
Цель. Рассмотрение возможных механизмов и последствий выхода государств-членов Европейского союза 
(ЕС) из экономического и валютного союза (ЭВС), оценка применимости европейского опыта для развития 
валютно-экономической интеграции стран Евразийского экономического союза (ЕАЭС).
Методология. Авторы статьи используют метод сценарного анализа для оценки правовых оснований, проце-
дур, механизмов и последствий выхода государств-членов ЕС из экономического и валютного союза для уже 
реализуемого (Brexit) и наиболее вероятных вариантов.
Результаты: Для этого авторы систематизируют и последовательно анализируют предпосылки, хронологию 
формирования различных интеграционных объединений Европы, основополагающие юридические докумен-
ты и ключевые вехи становления валютной интеграции в ЕС, этапы формирования в Европе ЭВС в его совре-
менном виде. В статье рассматривается вероятность полного или частичного распада ЭВС (EURO-crack). В их 
числе выход из Еврозоны: с последующим немедленным направлением заявки на повторное вступление, без 
участия в валютном союзе; с сохранением членства в ЕС по основаниям, предусмотренным Венской конвен-
ции о праве международных договоров или вытекающим из Договора о функционировании ЕС.
Выводы. Авторы делают выводы о том, что современная система международного права содержит эффек-
тивный механизм денонсации Договора о ЕС и отдельных его положений. Аргументируют они и возможность 
изменения правового статуса государств-членов с разной степенью участия в ЭВС и, на примере Италии, при-
водят критику инициативы по одностороннему выходу государства-члена из ЭВС.
Правовое исследование европейского опыта, проведенное авторами, позволило им сопоставить и положения 
документов ЕС и Евразийского экономического союза (ЕАЭС) (Договора, Протокола 15), и степень зрелости ин-
теграционных процессов последнего. Сделанные авторами выводы о перспективах валютно-экономической 
интеграции государств-членов ЕАЭС положены ими в основу рекомендаций по углублению экономической 
интеграции, созданию общего финансового рынка ЕАЭС. Приведенные в статье выводы и рекомендации по 
принятию мер для дальнейшего углубления экономической интеграции с государствами Евразийского эконо-
мического союза (ЕАЭС) актуальны для органов государственной власти Российской Федерации, в том числе 
экономических властей и органов дипломатии.
Ключевые слова: Европейский союз; Евразийский экономический союз; экономический валютный союз; эко-
номическая интеграция; правовой статус; европейский опыт; выход из ЭВС.
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THE TEXT
1. THE REVIEW OF EUROPEAN MONETARY 
INTEGRATION DEVELOPMENT
The history of modern European monetary integration 
roots back to 1926. It was then that in the course of 
Pan European Congress in Vienna the representatives 
of several nongovernmental organizations and some 
European states lobbying the creation of the United 
European States for the first time started to discuss 
possible creation of “European Customs Union” 
and introduction of a single “European currency”. 
Preliminary action plan to accelerate integration was 
drawn up. [1]
However, in view of several economic and political 
reasons the real implementation of monetary integration 
started only in 1968 when the development of the project 
to shape the economic and monetary union (EMU) [2] 
in the context of European communities was launched. 
The creation of EMU occurred amid the confrontation 
of two European blocs: “economists” and “monetarists”. 
“Economists”, which included FRG, suggested putting off 
the adoption of a single European currency and keeping 
national currencies with floating rates at the first stage 
of the integration. But “Monetarists” led by France ad-
vocated the comprehensive monetary association with 
fixed rates of European currencies against common 
European currency unit.
In 1969, pursuant to the meeting of member state 
leaders the Council of EU took a decision to create both 
economic and monetary union at the same time. To draw 
up the Unions development plan the panel of experts 
led by Pierre Werner, the prime minister of Luxembourg, 
was formed. The plan worked out by the panel of experts 
(known as “Werner’s plan”) was stipulated in a separate 
Resolution of European Communities Council dated 
1971 which adopted the programme of economic and 
monetary union development at three stages by 1980 1. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the document 
expressed the political will of several European states 
rather than be a guideline for action.
In 1971 the emerging EMU faced the first serious 
challenge when global monetary crisis initiated by the 
decision of the USA to give up gold standard for the 
American dollar struck. The European currencies fluctua-
tion range expanded up to 2.25% put European reformers 
at a stand. However, the solution to the problem was 
found soon —  in 1972 known as “currency snake” to 
reduce the fluctuation of European currencies against 
each other was introduced. And they adopted the range 
of 2.25% within which the fluctuation against the US 
1 JO. C28 du 27.03.1971. P. 1.
dollar was acceptable. If the currency rate was out of 
the range the national central banks were to conduct 
immediate currency interventions to stabilize the rate.
Nevertheless, even upon creation of European Mon-
etary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) 2 to provide lending to 
EMU member states it became evident that “currency 
snake” could be an efficient tool only for the states with 
relatively stable economies. For the others, the interven-
tions which were unable to stabilize the rate turned out 
to be just the waste of funds. This is precisely why the 
number of “snake” proponents gradually went down. In 
1979 the mechanism was abolished. The ideas stipulated 
in Werner’s plan were to be implemented only partially 
due to unstable economic environment in Europe.
The next stage of European monetary integration was 
the creation of European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. 
It owes its creation to Helmut Schmidt, the chancellor 
of FRG, and Valery Giscard d’Estaing, the president of 
the French Republic. It is worth mentioning that unlike 
Werner’s Plan EMS is not only declared politically but 
stipulated in the law —  by Regulation (EEC) № 3181/78 
by the Council dated 18 December, 1978 on European 
Monetary System 3. It is worth looking into the major 
features of EMS.
Firstly, the member states again started to define 
and shape their monetary policies.
Secondly, the American dollar ceased to be the bench-
mark and the states didn’t take it into account while 
determining their currency rates any more.
Thirdly, “currency snake” mechanism was replaced by 
more flawless (from the standpoint of its creators) ECU 4, 
the “basket” of all member state currencies.
Therefore, the creation of ECS can be regarded as the 
first complete stage of European monetary integration 
development, as the previous stages turned out to be 
only trial and preparatory ones.
The second stage of monetary integration develop-
ment in the EU started in the late 80s of XX century. The 
major tools of European Monetary System were already 
in place by that time. The idea to create a single bank 
for European states and a single currency resistant to 
fluctuations of other global currencies was already in 
the air. The European Commission put forward and idea 
to set up more flawless Economic and Monetary Union. 
Jacques Delors, the president of the European Commis-
sion, was appointed as the head of the committee which 
was to work out the plan of EMU creation and functioning.
2 Regulation (EEC) № 90/73 of the Council dated 3 April 1973 
on the establishment of Monetary Cooperation Fund // JO L 89 
du 5.4.1973. P. 1.
3 JO L 379 du 30.12.1978. Р. 1.
4 ECU-European currency unit.
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The document drawn up by the committee and named 
“Delors’ Plan” came out in April 1989. In December 1989 
the plan was approved at the meeting of the Council of 
Europe. The provisions of Delors’ Plan were embodied in 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1992. Therefore, 
the development of the modern EMU can be divided into 
three following stages.
The first stage (from 1990 till 1993) consisted of pre-
paratory measures to facilitate entry of Maastricht Treaty 
into effect. In particular, the stage included elimination 
of obstacles to free movement of capital within the EU, 
financial rehabilitation of some member states, initial 
convergence in inflation rates and economic indicators.
The second stage (from 1994 till 1998) included the 
complete coordination of EU member states economies 
based on 4 criteria (known as economic convergence 
criteria): (1) convergence in inflation, (2) convergence 
in long term interest rates on the banking market, (3) 
remedying excessive budget deficit, (4) retaining sustain-
able currency rates till the adoption of the euro.
The final third stage started in 1999 and lasted till 
2002. The major outcome of this stage was the complete 
adoption of the single European currency —  the euro 
by EU member states. The corresponding banking and 
legal mechanisms were launched. At the start the euro 
was introduced for non-cash payments only, then to 
gradually replace national currencies in cash turnover 
cash money was printed.
That is precisely how European Economic and Mon-
etary Union was created, which is still functioning with 
very few amendments to its legal framework. However, 
current economic and political landscape makes it impos-
sible for the EU as a whole and its economy in particular 
to facilitate stable functioning. That is exactly why it is 
worth elaborating on the prospects of further EU and 
EMU development not only in glowing colours but ana-
lyzes the scenarios and mechanisms of Economic and 
Monetary Union breakup.
2. THE MECHANISM OF EUROPEAN 
UNION MEMBER STATES EXIT FROM 
THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
Over more than nine years already —  from the very 
beginning of global financial and economic crisis of 
2008 —  in Italy and admittedly in whole Europe there 
has been continuous elaboration on possible ways to 
conduct exit from the Eurozone. The discussion of this 
issue among academic economists and subsequently 
in legal circles and at the political level turned into 
the most active phase in 2011 and 2012 when a most 
severe financial and budget crisis hit Greece. Known 
as Brexit in 2016 and subsequent tough fight between 
Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen in the course 
of the presidential election in France in April and May 
2017 fueled another wave of discussion about the fate 
of EMU and the Eurozone. We shouldn’t forget that 
Great Britain was among the Economic and Monetary 
Union members with derogation, i. e. fully exercising 
all four economic freedoms 5, without being a part of 
the Eurozone. At the same time, Greece and France 
are full-fledged members of EMU and due to political 
and/or economic reasons their exit from the Eurozone 
might well bring about knock-on effect of wide-scale 
abolishment of the single currency by European states.
Regardless of worrying signs, which come out from 
time to time, European political and economic establish-
ment avoids serious talk on possible exit of EU member 
states from the EMU reckoning that under the current 
legal framework the Eurozone breakup is impossible and/
or unfeasible. For instance, Mario Draghi, the president 
of the European Central Bank (ECB), claimed over and 
over again that the single European currency couldn’t 
be merely abolished. [3] Even those who don’t rule out 
the possibility of complete or partial breakup of the EMU 
(which has already been labelled by some scholars as 
“EURO-crack”) are actively elaborating on considerable 
expenses and economic losses for those states which 
would take a decision on exit from the EMU and switching 
back to their national currencies. Especially significant 
losses are predicted for those states which will venture 
upon a unilateral exit from the EMU. However, forecasts 
of such expenses and losses are not voiced. Anyway, many 
distinguished politicians and prominent economists 
openly claim that bilateral abolishment of the euro by a 
single EU member state won’t go in line with European 
economic integration development strategy and is a step 
backward in the European progress as a whole. However, 
the concerns that unilateral abolishment of the euro will 
hit mostly the pockets of the least wealthy population 
and middle class and reduce people’s real income are 
far from being groundless. We already witnessed this 
phenomenon in a number of European states within 
the period of 1999–2002 when the euro was adopted.
That’s where we cease to elaborate on possible im-
plications of “EURO-crack” and are going to look into 
possible mechanisms for EU member states to leave the 
Economic and Monetary Union. We are of the opinion 
that the following options are possible: (1) EU mem-
ber state exit from the Union (Brexit scenario) and (2) 
exit of one or more states from the Eurozone retaining 
the membership in the European Union. It should be 
specified that exit from the Eurozone (i. e. abolishment 
5 “Four freedoms” is the term which appeared on the basis of 
free movement of goods, services, people and capital stipulated 
in treaty of Rome of 1957 OJ C325, 24.12.2002, p. 33–184.
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of the single currency) cannot be considered equal to 
the complete exit of a state from the EMU. As a matter 
of fact, leaving the “euro zone” a state gains the status 
of an EU member state with derogation 6. Thus, let’s 
look into possible scenarios of Eurozone breakup from 
the perspective of permissibility and feasibility under 
the current legal regulation of the EMU creation and 
functioning.
2.1. Exit of a state from the European Union
The possibility to leave the European Union and as 
a result the EMU has quite particular legal grounds. 
Brexit can be regarded as a vivid example. The exit of 
Great Britain from the EU is carried out under Article 
50 of the Treaty on European Union (known as Article 
50 of Lisbon Treaty) 7. It should be noted that already 
well known fiftieth article came into force relatively 
recently-01.12.2009. The article embodies the pro-
visions which stipulate the procedure to denounce 
Lisbon Treaty and member state exit from the Union. 
The exit is effected under the constitutional law of 
the corresponding state by filing with the Council of 
Europe the notice proposing negotiations to solve the 
following tasks:
• to determine the terms of the agreement on 
member state exit from the Union;
• to determine the legal terms for further coopera-
tion between the EU and the state leaving.
The Treaty on EU also specifies the rules of negotia-
tions procedure to sing the agreement on the exit (para-
graph 3, article 218 of the Treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union). The agreement on the exit is signed 
by the EU Council on behalf of the Union. The approval 
of the draft agreement is effected by qualified majority 
voting upon the approval of the European Parliament. 
The provisions of the Treaty on the EU cease to apply 
to the leaving state on the date when the agreement 
on the exit comes into force or, in the event such an 
agreement is not signed, in two years after the notice 
of the exit, unless the Council of Europe unanimously 
decides to prolong this term subject to the consent of 
the state concerned.
It is not surprising that Article 50 of Lisbon Treaty 
removes the representatives of the leaving member 
state in the Council of Europe and the EU Council from 
discussion and decision making process by the Council 
of Europe and the EU Council concerning the approval 
of the agreement on the exit and determination of the 
6 As of today these countries are Bulgaria, Great Britain, 
Hungary, Denmark, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Sweden.
7 Treaty on European Union // OJ C326, 26.10.2012, p. 44.
legal terms for further cooperation between the EU and 
the leaving state.
If a member state which left the Union files an ap-
plication for a repeat accession then such an application 
is subject to the common procedure of new member 
acceptance without any exempts or preferences.
Technically, when a state leaves the EU its member-
ship in the EMU is terminated automatically along with 
its representation in the institutions and bodies of the 
Union. In the near future we will be able to witness how 
the process of the member state exit from the EU will be 
effected in practice in the case of Great Britain. For right 
now we can only speculate on the terms of the agreement 
on the exit and nature of cooperation between the United 
Kingdom and the EU. However, we may suppose that 
in terms of the state economic security and wellbeing 
of Great Britain citizens Brexit may be not that painful 
since as a EMU member state with a derogation Great 
Britain was not a part of the Eurozone retaining its own 
national currency. The British are also optimistic in view 
of the low dependence, as opposed to other EU member 
states, of the British economy on the European market.
2.2. Exit of a state from the European Union with 
further immediate application for repeat accession 
without taking part in the monetary union
As we have already stated the Treaty on European Union 
implies the possibility and stipulates the procedure to 
leave the EU. On the other hand, the Treaty doesn’t 
embody the provisions which specify the mechanism to 
leave the monetary union. The lack of such a mechanism 
brings about theoretical speculation, search for uncon-
ventional solutions and frankly speaking, even sheer 
fantasies. For instance, some Italian experts are serious 
when they examine the exit from the Union itself with 
immediate repeat accession as a solution to the issue 
of exit from the Eurozone. However, these very experts 
specify that this sort of solution to the problem is likely 
to cause aggressive political opposition from institutions 
and bodies of the EU and obviously, member states of 
the Union. [3]
2.3. Exit of a state from the Eurozone while retain-
ing the EU membership
One would think that based on common sense with the 
possibility to leave the European Union in place there 
should be the possibility to leave the Eurozone through 
refusal to be a part of the monetary union. However, 
until recently the idea that the exit from the monetary 
union retaining the EU membership was not an option 
prevailed in the European establishment. This opinion 
was based on limited interpretation of the Treaty on EU. 
Especially, Jacques Attali, one of the Maastricht Treaty 
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ideologists, repeatedly claimed that the fulfillment by 
the Eurozone states of economic convergence criteria 
stipulated in the Treaty on the EU led to such a level of 
national economies interdependence that their efficient 
functioning without being a part of the EMU is simply 
impossible. It must be said that such claims should be 
regarded as purely political declarations rather than eco-
nomically or legally proved ideas 8. In fact, the Treaty on 
European Union doesn’t only contain the direct restric-
tion but any direct and/or indirect limitation of member 
states right to leave the Eurozone and switch back to 
sovereign national currencies. Extended interpretation 
of the EU law provisions enables to work out a number 
of possible though quite complicated legal solutions to 
the issue of exit from the Eurozone. It should be noted 
that complexity and plurality of solutions is caused by 
nonhomogeneous legal framework of the EMU. Unlike 
the EU which legal framework is sophisticated to some 
extent but it is a single codified edition of Treaties on 
the European Communities, the European Economic 
and Monetary Union rests upon not a single treaty but 
a complicated and diverse set of rules and norms: provi-
sions of the Treaty on EU and other treaties, agreements, 
protocols of decisions made by institutions and bodies 
of the EU let alone other numerous documents. We are 
going to provide a successive review of those solutions 
which are dictated by applicable rule of law in the EU.
2.3.1. Termination of the Treaty on the grounds stipu-
lated in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(hereafter —  Vienna Convention) 9
Article 62 of Vienna Convention empowers parties to 
treaties (which are the EU member states) refer to funda-
mental change of circumstances as the grounds for treaty 
termination or to leave it. Basically, article 62 represents 
rebus sic stantibus clause, i. e. the clause about changed 
circumstances, with respect to treaties. As of today, after 
a quarter of the century when the European Union was 
created and 18 years when the EMU was completely 
shaped, it is evident that many goals set for the Union 
by its ideologists and creators haven’t been achieved. 
We imply the following, for instance:
• The Union shall offer its citizens an area of free-
dom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in 
which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunc-
tion with appropriate measures with respect to external 
8 http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4230697  —  Le 
Pen and Macron had absolutely different opinions regarding 
Euro zone // TASS, 04.05.2017.
9 The Convention of the Organization of the United Nations on 
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) dated 23 May 1969, 
http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/
law_treaties.shtml.
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention 
and combating of crime (p. 2 art. 3 of the Treaty on EU). 
Current migration crisis vividly demonstrates that the 
European Union is incapable of offering its citizens an 
area of freedom taken in conjunction with measures to 
take control over migration;
• The Union shall establish an internal market. It 
shall work for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stabil-
ity, a highly competitive social market economy, aim-
ing at full employment and social progress, and a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment. It shall promote scientific and tech-
nological advance. It shall promote economic, social 
and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Mem-
ber States (p. 3 art. 3 of the Treaty on the EU). These 
provisions raise the biggest number of questions 
among European and particularly Italian “euro con-
servatives”. From their perspective, high unemploy-
ment rate (particularly among youth), humiliatingly 
low wages (particularly in correlation to the cost of 
living) and continuous surge in social tension and ag-
gression level in the society indicate inconsistent and 
inefficient Union policy and as a minimum its partial 
failure to achieve the goals and tasks set in the Treaty 
on EU. [3]
There are reasons to believe that incapability of the 
Union to fulfill its commitments set in the Treaty on 
EU over a long period of time can be regarded as a 
fundamental change of circumstances and the Treaty 
can be subject to termination under art. 62 of Vienna 
Convention;
Under art. 44 of Vienna Convention (Separability of 
Treaty provisions), “a right of a party to denounce, with-
draw from or suspend the operation of the treaty may be 
exercised only with respect to the whole treaty unless the 
treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree”, 
other than in respect of treaty obligations nonfulfill-
ment cases (art. 60 of Vienna Convention). There is an 
opinion that incapability of institutions and bodies of 
the European Union and equally member states them-
selves to ensure complete implementation of social and 
economic guarantees set in the Treaty on EU represents 
nonfulfillment of treaty obligations;
Under art. 44 of Vienna Convention if the ground 
to terminate separate treaty provisions arises it can be 
referred to particularly if “the said clauses are separable 
from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their ap-
plication”. The separate provision of the Treaty on EU, 
article 4, stipulates that the Union shall establish the 
Economic and Monetary Union whose currency is the 
euro. Even the basic lexical interpretation of the Treaty 
on EU leads to the conclusion on separability of provi-
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sion of article 4 from the remainder of the treaty with 
regard to their application.
Based on the foregoing we conclude that current 
system of international law contains an efficient mecha-
nism to denounce the Treaty on EU and/or its separate 
provisions. Meanwhile, we should remember that this 
mechanism is beyond the scope of the European Union 
law system. Based on the principle of international law 
supremacy over national one and supremacy of universal 
rules over the private ones we conclude that the right-
fulness of full or partial denunciation of the Treaty on 
EU on the part of the European Union member state 
on the grounds stated in the UN Convention on the 
Law of Treaties cannot be questioned by other member 
states along with institutions and bodies of the Union.
2.3.2. Exit from the Eurozone on the grounds arising 
out of the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union 10.
The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(art. art. 139 and 140 of part 3 of the Treaty, title VIII 
“Economic and Monetary Policy”, chapter 5 “Transitional 
Provisions”) stipulates two legal statuses for the EU 
member states:
1) Monetary Union member states —  participants of 
known as “Euro zone;
2) Member states with a derogation without being 
a part of the monetary union. The latter ones can be 
divided into three categories:
• the states which have fulfilled economic conver-
gence criteria stated in the Treaty on EU but decided 
to exercise their right to refrain from taking part in the 
monetary union on “opt-out” principle (for instance, 
Great Britain and Denmark);
• the states which refrained from fulfilling one of 
the economic convergence criteria in advance (for in-
stance, Sweden which was not a part of the European 
Monetary System within two years prior to the devel-
opment of the EMU);
• the states which don’t comply with economic 
convergence criteria by the decision of the EU Council 
(as at 1999 there are none).
The fact that the Treaty on the functioning of the 
EU embodies detailed provisions which determine legal 
status of member states with different levels of involve-
ment in the EMU leads us to the conclusion that the shift 
from one status to another is quite possible. However, 
it is the lack of legally specified mechanism and clear 
procedure of transition from “full-fledged” member-
ship in the EMU to the membership “with a derogation” 
which puzzles the proponents of the possibility to leave 
10 http://eulaw.ru/treaties/tfeu.
the “Euro zone”. At the same time, from the perspec-
tive of EMU apologists, the lack of such mechanisms 
and procedures is not a flaw through an oversight but 
a far-reaching intent of EMU founding treaties authors 
whose main goal was to rule out complete or partial 
breakup of the EMU.
Article 347, part 7 of the Treaty (“General and Final 
Provisions”) stipulates that member states shall consult 
each other “with a view to taking together the steps 
needed to prevent the functioning of the internal market 
being affected by measures which a Member State may 
be called upon to take in the event of serious internal 
disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and or-
der, in the event of war, serious international tension 
constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out ob-
ligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining 
peace and international security”. We reckon that this 
provision of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU can 
be interpreted as a mechanism for decision making in-
cluding that of an economic nature in the event of crisis 
developments in national economies and socio-political 
spheres of individual member states. The developments 
in Greece in 2015 can be viewed as an example of seri-
ous internal disturbances constituting a threat to the 
functioning of the internal market.
The proponents of the EMU cohesion apparently dis-
semble when they claim that the procedure of exit doesn’t 
exist at all and/or working out such a procedure at short 
notice is impossible. It is proved by the provisions of p.6 
art. 28 of the Treaty on the EU (“Simplified revision pro-
cedures”) under which “the Government of any Member 
State, the European Parliament or the Commission may 
submit to the European Council proposals for revising all 
or part of the provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union relating to the 
internal policies and action of the Union. The European 
Council may adopt a decision amending all or part of the 
provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. The European Council shall act by 
unanimity after consulting the European Parliament and 
the Commission, and the European Central Bank in the 
case of institutional changes in the monetary area. That 
decision shall not enter into force until it is approved by 
the Member States in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements”. In other words, it implies 
that Title VIII of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU 
“Economic and Monetary Policy” may be amended and/
or supplemented, i. e. by the provisions which specify 
how a member states leaves the EMU and/or a state may 
change its status and become a member state “with a 
derogation”. Therefore, the procedure of decision making 
on amending the provisions of the Treaty of the EMU 
is complicated and takes long but, nevertheless, exists 
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and can be carried out given the political will of member 
states and the institutions of the EU.
2.3.3. Criticism of the initiative on unilateral exit of a 
member state from EMU drawing on the case of Italy
Contrary to all sorts of claims and speculation made by 
some political circles, “5 stars” movement for instance, 
unilateral exit of Italy from the Economic and Monetary 
Union through adoption of a national law, a decree-
law or even based on the results of a corresponding 
referendum cannot be carried out without complete 
denunciation of the Treaty on European Union and 
founding Treaties and Agreements of European Com-
munities. The point is that art. art. 11 and 117 of the 
Italian Constitution restrain the sovereignty of the 
Republic and under them the legislative branch is sub-
ject to the provisions of the European Union law and 
international obligations undertaken by Italy (norms and 
rules of treaties). Moreover, under art. 75 of the Italian 
Constitution national referendum on the adoption or 
ratification of treaties is directly prohibited. Therefore, 
from the perspective of the Italian constitutional law exit 
from the EMU cannot be carried out without numerous 
complicated amendments to the Constitution of the 
Republic. However, membership in the Economic and 
Monetary Union keeps putting considerable strain on 
the Italian economy which cannot but fuel political ten-
sion inside the country and it creates relevant grounds 
for continuous heated debates over the possibility and 
necessity to leave the “Eurozone”.
3. EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
AND PROSPECTS OF ECONOMIC 
AND MONETARY INTEGRATION WITHIN 
EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION
Eurasian Economic Union is an international organiza-
tion of regional economic integration possessing inter-
national legal personality and founded by the Treaty on 
the Eurasian Economic Union signed by the leaders of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russian in Astana on 29 May 
2014 11. The signed Treaty certainly creates new prospects 
for common integration policy effected by EAEU member 
states. Thus, article 64 of the Treaty on the EAEU enun-
ciate the following objectives and principles of agreed 
monetary policy of member states: 12
1) phased harmonization and convergence of ap-
proaches to the formation and implementation of their 
monetary policy to the extent corresponding to the 
11 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Pages/eec_quest.
aspx —  The definition on the official website of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission.
12 The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (signed in 
Astana 29.05.2014).
current macroeconomic integration and cooperation 
requirements;
2) establishment of the required organizational and 
legal conditions at the national and interstate levels 
for the development of integration processes in the 
monetary sphere, as well as for the coordination and 
harmonization of monetary policy;
3) inapplicability of any actions in the monetary 
sphere that may adversely affect the development of 
integration processes and, when such actions are in-
evitable, ensuring minimization of their consequences;
4) implementation of economic policy aimed at in-
creasing confidence in national currencies of member 
states both on each state domestic currency market and 
international monetary markets:
Moreover, article 63 of the Treaty on the EAEU speci-
fies particular economic indicators which are to be fol-
lowed by member states:
• annual deficit of public sector consolidated 
budget shall not exceed 3 per cent of gross domestic 
product;
• public sector debt shall not exceed 50 per cent of 
gross domestic product;
• inflation rate (consumer price index) per annum 
(December to December of the previous year, in per-
centage terms) shall not exceed the lowest inflation 
rate among member states by more than 5 percentage 
points.
Along with that, the EAEU member states agreed on 
and signed known as Protocol 15 to the Treaty on the 
EAEU which provides a more detailed specification of 
integration processes regulation within the framework 
of the community. The basic analysis of these documents 
demonstrates that the authors were mostly guided by 
the EU experience. Thus, for instance, section 1 article 
3 of Protocol 15 stipulates “coordination of national 
currencies exchange rate policy to ensure extended 
usage of member states national currencies for mutual 
settlements among member states residents, includ-
ing arrangement of mutual consultations to develop 
and coordinate measures of monetary policy.” Section 
2 art. 3 of the Protocol stipulates “to ensure convert-
ibility of their national currencies for the current and 
capital balance of payment items, without restrictions, 
by enabling unrestricted purchase and sale of foreign 
currency by residents of the Member States through the 
banks of the Member States.” The indicators used as a 
basis for article 63 of the Treaty on the EAEU in many 
respects are similar to those of the EU founding docu-
ments provisions.
Apart from that, above mentioned clauses of Protocol 
15 really remind of the first stage in the EU Economic 
and Monetary Union development. We reiterate that 
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from 1990 till 1993 the EU carried out activities to ensure 
financial rehabilitation of member states and coordi-
nated measures in the area of free capital movement 
within the EU.
However, unlike the European Union the EAEU mem-
ber states are taking more moderate steps and therefore, 
we may assume that monetary integration process is 
going to take longer that in the EU. It is worth mention-
ing that slower integration processes are not so much 
explained by the will of member states but caused by 
unstable foreign political and economic landscape. Thus, 
the document “On major objectives of macroeconomic 
policy of the Eurasian Economic Union member states 
for 2017–2018” 13 refers to the following adverse factors 
for the EAEU:
• fall in prices for major exports and deterioration 
in global economy and economic environment for core 
trading partners;
• extension of restrictive measures (sanctions) 
against Russia on the part of several states and inter-
national organizations with respect to access to ex-
ternal finances, products and technologies as well as 
implementation of joint projects;
• contraction or slowdown of the economy com-
mon more or less to the major global economies in-
cluding the United States of America, the European 
Union states, the People’s Republic of China, countries 
of Latin America.
All in all, the document states that current indicators 
of the EAEU member states don’t correspond to those set 
in article 63 of the Treaty on the EAEU. As such, all the 
member states still exceed at least one of the indicators 
which define the economic development sustainability. 
Regardless of the fact that noncompliance with the es-
timated inflation rate (December to December of the 
previous year) by The Republic of Belarus, the Republic 
of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation was less con-
siderable compared with 2016 and amounted to 6.7, 4.6 
and 1.5 percentage points respectively current readings 
are still not in line with the agreed rate.
It is worth mentioning that one of the major condi-
tions for the adoption of a single currency within the 
EAEU is the need of businesses. Back in 2012 it was 
touched upon by Tatyana Valovaya, the Minister for 
the main areas of integration and macroeconomics 
of the EEC: “A single currency is the tip of monetary 
integration process. The adoption of a single currency 
should be driven by domestic economic needs of the 
13 https://docs.eaeunion.org/pd/ru-ru/0101539/pd_03032017  — 
“On major objectives of macroeconomic policy of the Eurasian 
Economic Union member states for 2017–2018” on the official 
website of the EAEU.
Customs Union member states. This need should emerge 
in the course of economic integration. The European 
Union adopted the euro due to the pressing need of 
businesses in a single currency. Now we should thor-
oughly analyze and understand at which integration 
stage, at which particular period of time we are going 
to require a single unit of account in order to do away 
with business expenses.” 14
So far, the major objective of the Eurasian Union is 
still the development of single financial market which 
should take place only by 2025. To this end it is necessary 
to harmonize national financial systems and financial 
regulation so that any commercial bank established in 
the EAEU states can operate within the whole area of 
the Union without any extra registration or licenses. 
The supranational financial regulator, which is to be 
established in Kazakhstan, shall define level playing 
field for the whole Eurasian space 15.
Within further almost 8 years the member states 
should implement the major principles of economic 
and monetary integration development. They include 
phasing, split-level and split-pace integration consistent 
with different economic development levels of member 
states, combination of market and state regulation, es-
tablishment of supranational regulating level [4].
The Eurasian Economic Union is comparatively a 
young international organization and the development 
of economic and monetary integration within it hasn’t 
been appropriately specified in founding and other sorts 
of documents of the organization yet. Thereby, we have 
nothing to do but forecast what these economic and 
monetary integrations are to lead to in the end. Regard-
less of the fact that the European Union experience is 
actively used by both politicians and scholars in their 
research we shouldn’t forget about the current global 
environment which has changed and is less stable and 
favourable than it used to be in Europe in 1990s of XX 
century. It is evident that the EAEU member states are 
to put much effort into harmonization of legislation and 
economic policy in compliance with the standards en-
shrined in the founding documents of the EAEU. Agreed 
macroeconomic policy is very essential for the EAEU 
states [5]. Since the first objective within the framework 
of economic integration is set for 2025 (the establish-
ment of supranational financial regulator) we are only 
14 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/be/nae/news/Pages/ 
20–06–2012.aspx —  Tatyana Valovaya, Board Member (Minister) 
for the main areas of integration and macroeconomics of the 
EEC: “Eurasian Economic Union is going to become one of the 
fundamental elements of global economy” // 20.06.2012.
15 https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/16744 —  Tatyana Valovaya: 
The objective of the EAEU is to develop single financial market 
by 2025 // “International life” 18.01.2017.
МИРОВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА
FINANCETP.FA.RU 81
to find out what the ideas and plans provided in this 
article are going to result in.
In view of the foregoing it seems to be reasonable to 
recommend the public authorities of the Russian Federa-
tion (including economic policymakers and diplomatic 
agencies) to take the following measures in the course 
of further economic integration with the EAEU states:
1) To conduct thorough and comprehensive assess-
ment of economic implications for Russia due to its 
participation in integration processes within the EAEU in 
the context of long term forecast of the Eurasian region 
economic development;
2) To carry out special-purpose research into the 
dynamics of integration and centrifugal processes with 
the EU in order to single out the factors which cause 
destabilization of international economic and monetary 
associations;
3) To elaborate on the mechanisms of complete and/
or partial denunciation of the Treaty on the EAEU provi-
sions to serve the interests and to defend the economic 
sovereignty of the Russian Federation in such a situation 
when further participation in an integration association 
may lose its relevance and economic practicality;
4) To apply cross disciplinary economic and legal 
approach while planning and implementing economic 
foreign policy of Russia;
5) To stand up for the maximum possible independ-
ence of Russia from votes of other members of such 
organizations while coordinating mechanisms and pro-
cedures of decision making within the framework of 
economic cooperation international organizations with 
participation of the Russian Federation;
6) To rule out the possibility of constitutional and 
other technically legal obstacles to implementation of 
sovereign economic policy of Russia through denuncia-
tion of individual international obligations which may 
become excessively onerous in the context of foreign 
economic environment.
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